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Editorial for the special issue of Rr{cPP on Multilateral
Governance of Nuclear Risks
U Behnarn Taebi and Sanneke Kuipers
Nuclear technology creates complex, intemationaf intergerrerational, and multi-level
risks. While these risks add to the institutional compleity of the global system, they also
contribute to the emergence of new forms and practices of risk govemance Risk
govemance "includes the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes, and
mechanisms concemed with how relevant risk information is collected, analyzed and
communicated and management decisions are taken" (Renn, 2ffi8,p.9). From the outset,
the literature on risk govem€uxce explicitly acknowledged the "transboundary,
intemational and ubiquitous" nature of risks (Renn,2008, p. 43). Yet, in the subsequent
decade, the multilaterality of risk govemance has received little scholarly attention (see
also Kuipers, van Griekery & van Asselt,20t8).
This speqial issue will focus on the Multilateral Challenges of Nuclear Risks,
whereby it addresses safety and security as well as safeguard issues associated with
nuclear risks. In this editorial, we will first discuss what we mean by "nuclear risk"
and "multilateral governance." We will wrap up by presenting the papers that deal
with these multilateral aspects of nuclear risks.
Nuclear Risk and Its (Inter)national Governance
Nuclear risks emanate from nuclear technologies and both in practice and in the
academic literature we discem three categories: safety, security, and safeguards risks.
Nuclear safety is, according to the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "the
protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, and the safety of
facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks" (IAEA et a1.,2006, p. 5). Nuclear
security relates to intentional malicious activities and to "[t]he prevention and detection
of, and resPonse tq theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other
malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated
facilities" [AEA, 2ffi7). Fnally, nuclear safeguard relates to the proliferation of nuclear
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weaPons and it aims to avoid the dispersal of proliferation-sensitive knowledge and to
prevent the availability of nuclear material or technologies that could conceivably be
used to manu-fachrre nuclear weapons. Generally speaking, wanium enrichmentfacilities
(as well as highly enriched uranium) and reprocessing plants for the recyding of nuclear
waste which gives rise to the extraction of plutonium (as well as weapon-grade
plutonium) are the technologies and materials that raise concem.l Each of the three
nuclear risk categories brings its own set of govemance challenges to the table.
Nuclear safety has given rise to a lot of govemance considerationq mainiy because
of the fact that early in the deployment of nuclear reactors, it became painfuity evident
that safety concems of nuclear risk are not going to be conJined by national border. As
the former Director General of the IAEA, Hans Blix, has eloquently put iL "A nuclear
accident anywhere is an accident everyrwhere." While there is an increasing need for
governing nuclear safety globally, this global govemance has rather been institutio-
nalized "by accident," arrd in response to nuclear accidents and disasters than pro-
actively and "by design" of institutions (Taebi & Mayer, 2017, p.20). Much of what is
currently in place in the global nuclear safety regime was a response to the Chemobyl
disaster (Findlay, 2011); also the Fukushima Daiichi accidents has again emphasized
the supranational character of nuclear risk and the need for its global govemance. An
elaborate set of institutions, regulations, guidelines, and conventions aim at ensuring
the safety of millions of tons of radioactive material and a vast number of nuclear
facilities, focusing strongly on how nation states should govem nuclear safety within
the con-fines of their national borders.
Nuclear securi$r govemance regime has even a weaker intemational focus than the
safety regime. The IAEA's programs were, until recently, fairly limited (Ferguson &
Reed, 2009). On the one hand this is sulprising because nuclear security relates to the
transboundary threat of nuclear or other radioactive material being used for criminal
Purposes (such as nuclear terrorism) (Boin, 2009). On the other hand, as national security
is often at stake in nuclear security govememce, any counbry's reluctance to renounce its
sovereignty becomes more underctandable. While certain nuclear activities such as
enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing have already been organized intemation-
ally (e.g" IAEA, 2005; Rosner, Kollar, & Malone, 2015), nuclear security is according to a
high official of the IAEA "almost exclusively governed by national law" (Tonhauser,
2013, p.174). It has been argued that nuclear security regimes could leam from the
existing practices and mechanism of the nuclear safety regimes (Bunn, 2013). A first step
is that the IAEA (2013) has started improving nuclear security by assisting states to
establish a national nudear security regime (which is lacking in most countries). The
Nuclear Secudty Summits-a series of conferences held in Washington D.C., Seoul, and
The Hague between 2011 and 2016-are another initiative (of then President Obama) to
help reduce "the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world, improving the
security of all nuclear material and radioactive sources [and] improving intemational
cooperation."2 While these conferences put nuclear security on the policy agendas of
nation states, not much has been reached in terms of intemational govemance of security
risks. Lr addition to difficulties associated with nationals security (as explained above) the
transnational govememce of nuclear security (even more than nuclear safety), nrns into
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br fact, the most effective intemational govemance regime is in place for nuclear
safeguard or non-proliferation, with the IAEA as a watchdog. Non-compliance with
nuclear safeguard agreements could "subject the State to curtailment or suspension of
assistance provided by the Agency, the recall of material and equipment, and/or the
suspension of the privileges and rights of Agency membership" (Tonhauseg 2013, p.
183). In additiory non-compliance with the safeguard agreements could be reported to
the General Assembly of the United Nations, which could in tum trigger Security
Council resolutions. The difficulty, however, remains to establish what constitutes non-
compliance, because clear definitions are lacking. hr the past, every single case of non-
compliance has posed its own unique challenges to the IAEA @indlay,2015).
Why Should It Be Dealt With in a Multilateral Way?
This special issue builds on the ongoing agreement in the literature that nuclear risks
--$e it safety, security or safeguard risks---+hould not be only dealt with at the national
level @unn, 2013; Bunn & Heinonen, 2011; Findlay, 2011; Taebi & Mayer, 2077). Tlne
notion of multilevel goveflrance that has gained importance in the process of European
integration therefore applies here. This special issue focuses on the multilateral
Sovemtu:Ice of nudear risks. The notion nultilatual emphasizes two key features. First,
nuclear risks have an intemational kansboundary character (both in terms of origin and
consequences) and, second, such risks require multi-Ieuel govemance because they are not
simply issues between national govemments and multinational/intemational bodies, but
give rise to challenging and complex interactions between local, regionaf nationai, and
supranational govemments, as well as well as non-govemmental and corporate actors
(van Asselt, Versluis, & Vos, 20L3; Marks,1993).
Introducing the Special Issue
Fiorentini (2019) discusses the multinational, and more specifically European
govemance of proliferation and safeguard risks. Building on novel theories about
European Union govemance, this paper analyzes the prospects under which
proliferation risks can be dealt with through innovative forms of govemance. In so
doing, Fiorentini discusses the overarching traits of proliferation risks while
focusing on the legitimacy of regional and global governance of non-proliferation
regimes. The paper offers several remarks on the ways in which proliferation risks
can be tackled legitimately and effectively.
Jenkins and Taebi (2019) discuss the multinational govemance of nuclear risks in
the context of energy justice discussions. This article investigates the viability of Energy
Justice as a framework to assist the govemance of multinational risks, emanating from
nuclear waste. Positioned between local and universal justice, the authors advocate for
the approach of multinational energy justice as a me€uils of considering justice
manifestations either between neighboring countries, or between geographically
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how to govem the risk of nuclear waste in a multinational fashion, by focusing on the
justice issues multinational nuclear waste repositories give rise to.
Yuliya Lyamzina and Paul Slovic (2019) are presenting a clear case of multi-level
govemal:rce with respect to risk communication regarding complex safety risks such as
radiation risks after a nuclear disaster. They argue that known factors (e.g., trust, dread)
that affect citizens' risk perception regarding radiation risks often pertain to planned
exPosure situations (such as the siting of a new plant or a waste repository cf. Drottz-
Sjoberg, 2010). Such factors also apply in post-accident exposure situation. Yet on top of
those, other risk perception factors (e.g., volition, controllability) may be more
prevalent for communities recovering from nuclear disaster. Authorities need to
acknowledge specific risk perceptions in a given population and its various subgroups,
in order to successfully incorporate such factors into their risk communication and
public engagement strategies. Failure to do so can foster a skeptical or angry public
reaction and hamper recovery both in terms of radiological risk reduction interventions
and in terms of a "rettm to normal life" for the communities involved. The authors
discuss how these failures can be prevented.
Notes
1. For an overview of safety, security, and safeguard issues with nuclear fuel cycles, see Taebi and
Kloosterman (2008, 2015).
2. Cited from the Nuclear Security Summit website: http://www.nss2014.com/en
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Taebi/Kuipers: Multilateral Governance of Nuclear Risks
Gobernanza multilateral de riesgos nucleares
Behnam Taebi y Sanneke Kuipers
La tecnologia nuclear crea riesgos complejos, intemacionales, intergeneracio-
nales y multinivel. Si bien estos riesgos se suman a la complejidad institucional del
sistema global, tambi6n contribuyen a la aparici6n de nuevas formas y prdcticas de
gobernabilidad de riesgos. La gobernanza de riesgos incluye la totalidad de actores,
normas, convenciones, procesos y mecanismos relacionados con la informaci5n
relevante sobre riesgos. se recopila, at:taliza y comunica, y se toman decisiones de
gesti6n" (Renn,2008, p. 9). Desde el principio, la literatura sobre la gobemanza del
riesgo reconoci6 explicitamente la naturaleza "trarrsfronteriza, internacional y
ubicua" de los riesgos (Renn 2008, p. 43). Sin embargo, en la d6cada siguiente, la
multilateralidad de la gobernanza del riesgo ha recibido poca atenci6n acad6mica
(v6ase tambi6n Kuipers, van Grieken, & van Asselt, 2018).
Este nrimero especial se centrard en los Desafios Multilaterales de Riesgos
Nucleares, por lo que aborda la protecci6n y la seguridad, asi como los problemas
de salvaguardia asociados con los riesgos nucleares. En este editorial, primero
discutiremos qu6 entendemos por "riesgo nuclear" y "gobernabilidad multilateral."
Terminaremos presentando los documentos que tratan sobre estos aspectos
multilaterales de los riesgos nucleares.
Riesgos nucleares y su gobernanza (inter)nacional
Los riesgos nucleares emelnan de las tecnologias nucleares y tanto en la prdctica
como en la literatura acad6mica, distinguimos tres categorias: seguridad, seguridad
y riesgos de seguridad. La seguridad nuclear es, segdn el Organismo Intemacional
de Energfa At6mica (OIEA), "la protecci6n de las personas y el medio ambiente
contra los riesgos de radiaci6n, y la seguridad de las instalaciones y actividades que
generan riesgos de radiaci6n" (OIEA et aI., 2006, p. 5). La seguridad nuclear se
relaciona con actividades maliciosas intencionales y con "la prevenci6n y detecci6n
de robos, sabotajes, accesos no autorizados, transferencias ilegales u otros actos
maliciosos relacionados con materiales nucleares, otras sustancias radiactivas o sus
instalaciones asociadas" (OIEA, 2007). Finalmente, la salvaguardia nuclear se
relaciona con la proliferaci6n de armas nucleares y su objetivo es evitar la dispersi6n
del conocimiento sensible a la proliferaci6n y prevenir la disponibilidad de material
nuclear o tecnologias que posiblemente puedan usarse para fabricar armas
nucleares. En general, las instalaciones de enriquecimiento de uranio (asi como el
uranio altamente enriquecido) y las plantas de reprocesamiento para el reciclaje de
desechos nucleares que dan lugar a la extracci6n de plutonio (asi como el plutonio
apto para armas) son las tecnologias que mds preocupan. Cada una de las tres
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La seguridad nuclear ha dado lugar a muchas consideraciones de gobernabil-
idad, principalmente debido al hecho de que al principio del despliegue de los
teactores nucleares, se hizo dolorosamente evidente que las preocupaciones de
seguridad del riesgo nuclear no serian limitadas por las fronteras nacionales. Como
el ex director general del OIEA, Hans Blix, lo ha dicho con elocuencia: "IJn
accidente nuclear en cualquier lugar es un accidente en cualquier parte." Si bien
existe una creciente necesidad de gobernar la seguridad nuclear a nivel mundial,
esta gobernanza global se ha institucionalizado m6s bien "por accidente," y en
respuesta a accidentes y desastres nucleares que por "disefro" de las instituciones
(Taebi y Mayer, 2017, p.20). Gran parte de lo que actualmente existe en el r6gimen
de seguridad nuclear global fue una respuesta al desastre de Chernobyl (Findlay,
2011); tambi6n los accidentes de Fukushima Daiichi han enfatizado nuevamente el
cardcter supranacional del riesgo nuclear y la necesidad de su gobiemo global. Un
conjunto elaborado de instituciones, reglamentos, directrices y convenciones tiene
como objetivo garantizar la seguridad de millones de toneladas de material
radiactivo y un gran ndmero de instalaciones nucleares, se centra principalmente en
c6mo los estados nacionales deben gobernar la seguridad nuclear dentro de los
limites de sus fronteras nacionales.
El r6gimen de gobernanza de la seguridad nuclear tiene incluso un enfoque
internacional miis d6bil que el r6gimen de seguridad. Los programas del oIEA
fueron, hasta hace poco, bastante limitados (Ferguson y Reed, 2009). Por un lado,
esto es sorprendente porque la seguridad nuclear se relaciona con la amenaza
transfronteriza de la utilizaci6n de materiales nucleares u otros materiales
radiactivos con fines delictivos (como el terrorismo nuclear) (Boin, 2009). Por otro
lado, como la seguridad nacional estd a menudo en juego en la gobemanza de la
seguridad nuclear, la renuencia de cualquier pais a renunciar a su soberania se
vuelve m6s comprensible. Si bien ciertas actividades nucleares como el enriqueci-
miento, la fabricaci6n de combustible y el reprocesamiento ya se han organizado
internacionalmente (por ejemplo, OIEA, 2005; Rosner, Kollar, y Malone, 2015), la
seguridad nuclear est6 "casi exclusivamente regida por la ley nacional" (Tonhauser,
201,3, p. 174). Se ha argumentado que los regimenes de seguridad nuclear podrian
aprender de las pr6cticas y mecanismos existentes de los regimenes de seguridad
nuclear (Bunn 2013). Un primer paso es que el OIEA (2013) ha comenzado a mejorar
la seguridad nuclear ayudando a los estados a establecer un r6gimen nacional de
seguridad nuclear (que falta en la mayor(a de los paises). Las Cumbres de
Seguridad Nuclear, una serie de conferencias celebradas en Washington DC, Seril y
La Haya entre 2011 y 201,6, son otra iniciativa (del entonces Presidente Obama) para
ayudar a reducir "la cantidad de material nuclear peligroso en el mundo, mejorando
la seguridad de todos los materiales nucleares y fuentes radiactivas [y] mejorar la
cooperaci6n internacional". Si bien estas conferencias pusieron la seguridad nuclear
en las agendas politicas de los estados nacionales, no se ha alcanzado mucho en
t6rminos de gobernanza internacional de los riesgos de seguridad.
De hecho, el r6gimen de gobemanza intemacional mds efectivo estd en vigor para
la salvaguardia o la no proliferaci6n nuclear, con el OIEA como un perro guardian. El
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una restricci6n o suspensi6n de la asistencia prestada por el Organismo, el retiro de
materiales y equipos y / ola suspensi6n de los privilegios y derechos de la membresia
del organismo" (Tonhauset,2013,p. 1s3). Ademds, el incumplimiento de los acuerdos
de salvaguardia podrfa informarse a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas para
activar las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. Sin embargo, la dificultad sigue
siendo establecer qu6 constituye incumplimiento, porque faltan definiciones claras. En
el pasado, cada caso rjnico de incumplimiento ha planteado sus propios desafios rinicos
para el OIEA (Findlay,201.5).
;Por qu6 deberia ser tratado de forma multilateral?
Este nrimero especial se basa en el acuerdo actual en la literatura de que los
riesgos nucleares, ya sean de seguridad o de salvaguarda, no deben tratarse solo a
nivel nacional (Bunn, 2013; Bunn y Heinonen, 201.1; Findlay, 2011; Taebi y Mayer,
2017 ). La noci6n de gobemanza multinivel que ha ganado importancia en el
proceso de integraci6n europea, por lo tanto, se aplica aqui. Este ndmero especial se
centra en la gobernanza multilateral de los riesgos nucleares. La noci6n multilateral
enlatiza dos caracterfsticas clave. Primero, los riesgos nucleares tienen un cardcter
transfronterizo intemacional (tanto en t6rminos de origen como de consecuencias)
y, segundo, tales riesgos requieren una gobernanza multinivel porque no son
simplemente problemas entre los gobiernos nacionales y organismos multi-
nacionales / internacionales, sino que rigen los desafios para combinaciones
complejas de gobiemos locales, regionales, nacionales y supranacionales, asi como
de actores no gubernamentales y corporativos (van Asselt, versluis y Vos 2013;
Marks 1993).
Presentando el ntimero especial
Enrico Fiorentini analiza la gobemanza multinacional, y mds especificamente la
gobemanza europea de la proliferaci6n y los riesgos de salvaguardia. Sobre la base
de nuevas teorias sobre la gobernanza de la Uni6n Europea, este documento analiza
las perspectivas bajo las cuales los riesgos de proliferaci6n pueden abordarse a
trav6s de formas innovadoras de gobemanza. Al hacerlo, Fiorentini analiza los
ras$os generales de los riesgos de proliferaci6n y se centra en la legitimidad de la
gobemanza regional y global de los regimenes de no proliferaciSn. El documento
ofrece varias observaciones sobre las formas en que los riesgos de proliferaci6n
pueden abordarse de manera legitima y efectiva.
Kirsten Jenkins y Behnam Taebi discuten la gobernanza multinacional de los
riesgos nucleares en el contexto de las discusiones sobre justicia energ6tica. Este
articulo investiga la viabilidad de la Justicia de la Energia como un marco para
ayudar a la gesti6n de los riesgos multinacionales, derivados de los desechos
nucleares. Situados entre la justicia local y la justicia universal, los autores abogan
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considerar las manifestaciones de justicia, ya sea entre paises vecinos o entre paises
aislados geogrdficamente que comparten preocupaciones o sistemas de energia
comunes. Los autores discuten c6mo gobernar el riesgo de desperdicio nuclear de
una manera multinacional, enfocdndose en los asuntos de justicia que generan los
dep6sitos de desperdicios nucleares multinacionales.
Yuliya Lyamzina & Paul Slovic are presenting a clear case of multi-level
governance with respect to risk communication regarding complex safety risks such
as radiation risks after a nuclear disaster. They argue that known factors (e.g., trust,
dread) that affect citizens' risk perception regarding radiation risks often pertain to
planned exposure situations (such as the siting of a new plant or a waste repository,
cf. Drottz-Sjoberg, 2010). Such factors also apply in post-accident exposure situation.
Yet on top of those, other risk perception factors (e.g., volition, controllability) may
be more prevalent for communities recovering from nuclear disaster. Authorities
need to acknowledge specific risk perceptions in a given population and its various
subgroups, in order to successfully incorporate such factors into their risk
communication and public engagement strategies. Failure to do so can foster a
skeptical or angry public reaction and hamper recovery both in terms of radiological
risk reduction interventions and in terms of a 'return to normal life' for the
communities involved. The authors discuss how these failures can be prevented.
Yuliya Lyamzina y Paul Slovic estdn presentando un caso claro de gobemanza
multinivel con respecto a la comunicaci6n de riesgos con respecto a los riesgos
complejos de seguridad, como los riesgos de radiaci6n despu6s de un desastre
nuclear. Argumentan que los factores conocidos (por ejemplo, cottfianza, temor) que
afectan la percepci6n de riesgo de los ciudadanos con respecto a los riesgos de
radiaci6n a menudo pertenecen a situaciones de exposici6n planificadas (como la
ubicaci6n de una nueva planta o un dep6sito de residuos, v6ase Drottz-Sjtiberg,
2010). Tales factores tambi6n se aplican en situaciones de exposici6n post-accidente.
Sin embargo, ademds de eso, otros factores de percepci6n de riesgo (por ejemplo,
volici6n, capacidad de control) pueden ser mds frecuentes en las comunidades que
se recuPeran de un desastre nuclear. Las autoridades deben reconocer las
percepciones de riesgo especificas en una poblaci6n determinada y sus diversos
subgrupos, a fin de incorporar con 6xito dichos factores en sus estrategias de
comunicaci6n de riesgo y compromiso priblico. No hacerlo puede fomentar una
reacci6n priblica esc6ptica o enojada y obstaculizar \a recuperaci6n tanto en
t6rminos de intervenciones de reducci6n de riesgo radiol6gico como en t6rminos de
un "retomo a la vida normal" para las comunidades involucradas. Los autores
discuten c6mo se pueden prevenir estas fallas.
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